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Black Beauty—How Schultz and the Trial of Marion
True Changed Museum Acquisitions
MICHAEL MURALI
I. INTRODUCTION

C

ollecting remainders of history has long been a
human pastime. Looting and the trafficking of
looted items, especially art, were common as far
back as ancient Egypt.1 Yet, even in ancient times,
notable figures decried the plundering of ancient artifacts and
other items of value.2 Many of these items of historical value
ended up in world famous museums, including the Metropolitan
Museum of Art in New York City, Louvre in Paris, and British
Museum in London.3 By the 1970s, colonial plundering was no
longer a legitimate means to acquire ancient art, so museums
began looking to a different source to bolster their antiquities
collections.4 As a result, the trafficking in stolen art and artifacts
has become a multi-billion dollar endeavor rivaling the narcotics
and arms industries.5 However, in recent years
there has been a sea change in museums’
attitudes towards the collection of antiquities.
United States v. Schultz6 and its predecessors,
as well as the recent trial of Marion True in
Italy7 have resulted in museums’ changed
attitude towards establishing the provenance of items they acquire and addressing
patrimony claims.
This Article examines the diminishing
role of black markets in the antiquities trade.
In particular, this Article focuses on international conventions, American case law, and
the trial of Marion True to establish that there
has been a slow move away from looted art in
the American museum system. More importantly, this Article
examines how the Italian trial of an outspoken advocate of
caution in the acquisition of antiquities,8 Marion True, in the
wake of Schultz has slowly shifted museums’ focus towards
an emphasis on determining the origins of the items in their
collections.
Part I addresses the UNESCO Convention, the Cultural
Property Implementation Act (CPIA), the UNIDROIT
Convention, and the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA)
and their relevance to the criminal prosecution of international
cultural property crimes. Part II examines Schultz and its
predecessors in establishing a domestic criminal law standard
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for prosecuting international cultural property theft under the
NSPA, as well as alternative methods of prosecution in the
United States. Finally, Part III addresses the unique and fascinating case of the J. Paul Getty Museum (the Getty)—perhaps
the largest culprit of acquiring antiquities on the black market—
and how the trial of Marion True has changed the way museums
conduct business in the United States.

II. PAINT BY LETTER—UNESCO, THE CPIA,
UNIDROIT, AND THE NSPA
While frowned upon, looting during peacetime was an
accepted practice.9 Following the Napoleonic Wars, however,
the international community realized the destructive power
of war could easily cripple a state’s vast
cultural heritage.10 The 1899 and 1907 Hague
Conventions spawned the Hague Regulations,
of which Article 56 embodied the spirit of a
changing worldview; it initiated the largescale protection of cultural property.11 The
Great War was the next catalyst; Europe, having witnessed several cultural treasures looted
and destroyed by the Kaiser, provided a manner of restitution (arguably ineffectual) for
some of the nations whose property was taken
through the Treaty of Versailles.12 World War
II brought about similar concerns. During the
Nuremberg Trials, the Allied powers enforced
the 1907 Hague Regulations in response to
the extreme Nazi looting and destruction of Europe’s cultural
heritage that occurred.13
Thus far, the international law concerned itself with looting during wartime. What, then, of cultural property crime
during times of peace or art theft14 unrelated to war? Every
state, naturally, had local laws concerning theft. However, the
particularly large-scale of Hitler’s actions drew attention to the
need to protect cultural property in view of international looting
of culturally significant sites. Thus, from November 1-16, 1945,
the Conference for the Establishment of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
convened, creating the Constitution of UNESCO.15 UNESCO,
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in turn, begat the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (1954 Hague
Convention),16 which is the current international standard with
regards to the protection of cultural property, both in times
of war and peace.17 The Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague
Convention amended it in 1999 (the Second Protocol).18 These
conventions applied only in times of war;19 so beginning around
1970, a series of international conventions and domestic laws in
the United States addressed the serious issue of stolen cultural
property during times of peace.20 This Part will address the
impact of UNESCO on the international landscape, and how the
U.S. has responded through the NSPA.21

A. UNESCO—THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARD
UNESCO’s 1954 Hague Convention was a watershed
moment for cultural property protections. Unfortunately, it
was largely ineffectual. Through the later part of the twentieth
century, museums and private collectors continued to collect
great amounts of stolen art and artifacts, often from archaeological digs.22 UNESCO continued its efforts to combat cultural
property crime, but art theft, especially from digs, provided an
easy way to quietly make a lot of money.23 Three developments
created a more hostile atmosphere to art theft both domestically and internationally: (1) the Convention on the Means of
Prohibiting the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership
of Cultural Property (the UNESCO Convention),24 (2) the CPIA,
and (3) the International Institute for the Unification of Private
Law’s (UNIDROIT) Convention on the International Return
of Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (UNIDROIT
Convention).25

1. The UNESCO Convention
The UNESCO Convention was a means for member states
to “enter into pacts to enforce each other’s cultural property
laws.”26 It covers a wide swath of items of cultural interest—not
just those relegated items of archaeological significance.27 This
convention grants standing to member states to sue in foreign
courts to enforce the claimant’s national laws.28 Rather than
focusing on the military, as previous conventions have done, the
UNESCO Convention channels its attentions on the private trade
in antiquities.29 Perhaps most promising is that one hundred and
nine countries ratified it, including the United States in 1983.30
The UNESCO Convention proved to be a disappointment.
There was “no enforcement mechanism or framework for how a
claimant might be able to secure the return of cultural property,”
stolen or otherwise.31 It is non-self-executing, so states do not
have to adopt all the provisions contained within.32 It was not created with private parties in mind (despite the relative proximity
to World War II and claims by several private citizens for
the return of their stolen property) and even the U.S. only applied it to state parties.33 Perhaps its greatest shortcoming is
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the uneven distribution of rights between artifact-rich states
(typically claimants) and artifact-purchasing states (typically possessors/defendants).34 By ratifying the UNESCO
Convention, artifact-purchasing states would be agreeing
to allow suits to be filed in their courts using another state’s
criminal laws, and this is an unlikely outcome.35 Even the U.S.’s
incorporation of the UNESCO Convention conveniently left out
this requirement. Instead, the U.S. forced all petitions to come
through its government.36 As discussed in the following section,
the CPIA provided the next step towards honoring repatriation
claims and holding thieves criminally responsible.

2. The CPIA
The CPIA is the implementing legislation in the United
States for the UNESCO Convention property provision,
providing that
No article of cultural property documented as appertaining to the inventory of a museum or religious or
secular public monument or similar institution in any
State Party which is stolen from such institution after
the effective date of this chapter, or after the date of
entry into force of the Convention for the State Party,
whichever date is later, may be imported into the
United States.37
Whereas in the past, it was easier to fudge provenance
claims, the passage of the CPIA in 1983 allowed the U.S.
to start stemming the flow of black market antiquities into
museums such as the Getty, the Metropolitan Museum of Art
(the Met), and the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston. If a possessor
could not produce a valid export certificate for an item from a
country party to the 1954 Hague Convention within ninety days,
the item was subject “to seizure or forfeiture.”38 Such forfeited
property would then be “offered for repatriation to the State
Party from which the property was taken.”39 However, if the
possessor acquired the item in good faith (such as when there is
a clear chain of title to the cultural artifact), the state party would
then have to pay the possessor fair compensation, unless there is
a reciprocal arrangement with the U.S. waiving compensation
claims.40 Perhaps most notably, the CPIA establishes the
Cultural Property Advisory Committee (CPAC), with eleven
members serving three-year terms, appointed by the President:
[T]wo members representing the interests of museums;
[t]hree members who shall be experts in the fields of
archaeology, anthropology, ethnology, or related
areas; [t]hree members who shall be experts in the
international sale of archaeological, ethnological, and
other cultural property; [and t]hree members who shall
represent the interest of the general public.41
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The purpose of CPAC is to investigate the claims made
by a state party and submit a report on the investigation to
the President.42 CPAC also provides advice on international
agreements to implement the UNESCO Convention.43
The CPIA has its shortcomings. For example, the requirement that a state party would have to pay the possessor fair
compensation if the article is acquired in good faith may put a
strain on countries with small economies that cannot spare the
funds to recover their cultural
heritage. 44 Additionally, the
CPIA created an exception for
items of cultural property that
have been in the U.S. for at least
three years, in good faith, with
publication, exhibition, or cataloguing of its presence.45 The
CPIA also allows requests made
through the U.S. government
(specifically, the President) for
cultural patrimony claims, with
no direct action.46 Finally, the
CPIA applies to objects (and
fragments of such objects) that
are of archaeological or ethnological significance. An item is
of archaeological significance
if it “is of cultural significance,
is at least two hundred and fifty
years old, and was normally
discovered as a result of scientific excavation, clandestine or
accidental digging, or exploration on land or under water.”47 This definition, however,
exempts items from modern times that are equally culturally
significant.48 To redeem this defect, the CPIA also provides that
an item is of ethnological significance if it is “the product of
a tribal or nonindustrial society and important to the cultural
heritage of a people because of its distinctive characteristics,
comparative rarity, or its contribution to the knowledge of the
origins, development, or history of that people.”49 This provision was most likely added to prevent the pillaging of tribal and
native societies throughout the Americas.50
Thus, the CPIA provides a starting point in examining the
interplay of the U.S. and UNESCO in the fight against art theft.
Indeed the CPIA was perhaps the first major affirmative step
in the U.S. towards establishing a standard for dealing with
cultural property crimes. While the CPIA itself does not mention the prosecution of cultural property, the U.S. has prosecuted
several individuals for art theft.51 The body of international law
continued to evolve; while there were several conventions52 to
protect cultural property in the intervening years (including the

recognition of underwater cultural heritage and the need for its
protection in the Convention on the Law of the Sea),53 the next
major development was the UNIDROIT Convention.

3. The UNIDROIT Convention
The UNIDROIT Convention applies to international claims
for “the restitution of stolen cultural objects and the return of
cultural objects removed from the territory of a Contracting State
contrary to its law regulating
the export of cultural objects
for the purpose of protecting its
cultural heritage.”54 Its primary
goals included “restitution of
stolen cultural objects”55 and
the “return of illegally exported
cultural objects.”56 UNIDROIT
itself works to “reconcile the
rights of good faith purchasers
in art-purchasing nations and the
need for protection of archaeological resources in artifact-rich
nations.”57 It seeks to accomplish this goal by “encouraging
artifact-rich nations to maintain
catalogues of national collections, developing ties of friendship and cooperation among
museums in different countries,
working toward greater international recognition of national
cultural property laws, and
issuing a kind of identity card for
documented cultural objects.”58
The UNIDROIT Convention sets out guidelines for
enforcement, specifying that the claim must be international in
character.59 It clearly states, “The possessor of a cultural object
which has been stolen shall return it.”60 Cultural objects are
defined as, “those which, on religious or secular grounds, are
of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature,
art or science and belong to one of the categories listed in the
Annex to this Convention.”61 This, obviously, is a much broader
category than the “archaeological or ethnological” specification
in the CPIA.62 Under the UNIDROIT Convention, “[c]laims
must be made within three years from the time the claimant
discovers the location of the object and the identity of the possessor; however, all claims must be filed within fifty years of the
time of the theft.”63 Like the CPIA, the UNIDROIT Convention
also contains a good faith provision, wherein the claimant must
provide reasonable compensation for the item if it was acquired
in good faith.64 Additionally, the UNIDROIT Convention
provides for the return of illegally exported cultural property,
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though it must do so through a court or similarly competent
authority in the state where the property is held.65 In particular,
the possessor automatically defaults and must forfeit the item
if there is no export permit (a sure sign that the item was
purchased through the black market).66
The UNIDROIT Convention is also not a perfect solution
for the U.S. Perhaps the biggest problem domestically is that
it carries no force in the United States.67 While the CPIA does
offer several similar provisions, UNIDROIT provides more
leeway for the claimant68 and does not specify that the object
must be older than two hundred and fifty years old, 69 and
therefore can be considered more in line with the goals of the
UNESCO Convention. Additionally, while the CPIA limits the
cultural objects to those of “archaeological or ethnological”
significance,70 the UNIDROIT Convention has a much broader
spectrum of protected items.71 The CPIA, then, creates even
more of a limit on culturally significant items, exempting such
items as antiquities between a century and two hundred and fifty
years old and certain property relating to history. However, the
UNIDROIT Convention does not apply when “the export of
a cultural object is no longer illegal at the time at which the
return is requested or the object was exported during the lifetime of the person who created it or within a period of fifty years
following the death of that person.”72 Ideally, in such a circumstance, domestic criminal law standards will apply; though the
UNIDROIT Convention does not provide any clarity. As the
UNIDROIT Convention is not in full force in the U.S., it merely
serves as a guidepost and a possible affecter of domestic law.

B. THE NSPA—CRIMINALIZING AN
INTERNATIONAL OFFENSE
The NSPA73 is the major basis for criminal prosecution
of cultural property theft in the United States. It was passed
in 1934 as an extension of the National Motor Vehicle Act of
1919.74 Section 2314 provides for prosecution of “[w]hoever
transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of
the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been
stolen, converted or taken by fraud.”75 Section 2315 provides
for prosecution of:
Whoever receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters,
sells, or disposes of any goods, wares, or merchandise,
securities, or money of the value of $5,000 or more,
or pledges or accepts as security for a loan any goods,
wares, or merchandise, or securities, of the value
of $500 or more, which have crossed a State or
United States boundary after being stolen, unlawfully
converted, or taken, knowing the same to have been
stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken.76
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Taken with the CPIA, the NSPA could be the standard by
which patrimony claims are resolved and the international black
market in antiquities shut down in the United States. To date,
the NSPA has been the basis for almost all international art theft
prosecutions in the United States.77
Yet the U.S. has repeatedly encountered problems in
attempting to prosecute art thieves through the NSPA.78 In
particular, since the NSPA is a criminal statute, prosecutors
must prove the “scienter” element to the crime, that is, the
element of intent or knowledge of wrongdoing.79
Proving scienter is especially difficult due to the very
nature of black markets themselves. From finder to possessor,
the stolen item can pass through numerous hands, including
very discreet dealers and auction houses.80 The lack of procedural safeguards, or in many cases, the intentional disregard
of those safeguards, leads to an inability to show “a legitimate
chain of title,” and the final purchaser is not always aware of the
illegal nature of the item he or she has acquired.81 Despite this
setback, the NSPA has provided the basis for numerous claims
and the evolution of domestic criminal law towards prosecuting
individuals for the international crime of art theft.82

III. GAME CHANGE—HOW SCHULTZ CREATED
A NEW LEGAL LANDSCAPE
The NSPA and CPIA together spawned a line of cases that
applied domestic criminal law to international offenses.83 Due to
the difficulty of establishing that an object is stolen, prosecutors
have become adept at finding clever methods of bringing forth
a successful case against a defendant, a la Al Capone.84 This
Part examines what led up to seminal case of United States v.
Schultz,85 the impact of Schultz, and briefly examines alternative
methods employed by the U.S. government to prosecute art theft.

A. THE BEGINNINGS OF CHANGE
With the UNESCO Convention came a change in U.S.
attitude towards stolen cultural property. No longer were
provenance claims swept under the rug and patrimony claims
ignored. In 1970, the U.S. realized that these crimes were of vast
significance, in no small part due to an effort by archaeologists
to preserve their dig sites which were long subject to looting.86
As a result, a pair of cases87 emerged in the 1970s that would set
the standard for applying the NSPA to cases of stolen cultural
property going forward.
The first such case is United States v. Hollinshead.88
Hollinshead, an antiquities dealer specializing in pre-Columbian artifacts, financed a co-conspirator, Aramilla, to procure
such artifacts.89 The case particularly concerned one item, the
Machaquila Stele 2, worth several thousand dollars.90 The stele
was “found in a Mayan ruin in . . . Guatemala, cut into pieces,”
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brought to a man named Fell’s fish packing plant in Belize,
then marked as the “personal effects” to Hollinshead in Santa
Fe Springs, California.91 The stele traveled around the United
States, settling in California with Hollinshead before he was
arrested.92 Overwhelming evidence showed that the defendants
knew it was illegal to remove the stele from Guatemala under
Guatemalan law, and further knew the stele was stolen.93 The
Ninth Circuit dismissed eight of the claims raised on appeal
regarding evidentiary matters as lacking merit.94 However, the
court chose to examine the claim “that the court erroneously
instructed the jury that there is a presumption that every person
knows what the law forbids.”95 The district court judge defined
the word “stolen” as used in Section 2314 of the NSPA96 in his
jury instructions as “acquired, or possessed, as a result of some
wrongful or dishonest act or taking, whereby a person willfully
obtains or retains possession of property which belongs to
another, without or beyond any permission given, and with
the intent to deprive the owner of the benefit of ownership.”97
While there was no objection at that time to the definition, there
was an objection to the later jury instruction at question in this
case.98 Noting that the law in question was U.S. law, the government only needed to prove that the defendants knew the stele
was stolen,99 not from where it was stolen.100 The court then
drew the conclusion that the government did not need to prove
“the law of the place of theft,” reasoning Guatemalan law would
only bear on this case insofar as the defendants’ knowledge the
stele was stolen.101 The court stated that the jury instruction may
have been in error, but not to a prejudicial extent.102 By proving
the defendants “brib[ed] officials and us[ed] false marks on
the stele’s packaging to smuggle it into the United States,” the
government established beyond a reasonable doubt that they
knew the stele was stolen and they were smuggling it into the
U.S. in violation of the NSPA.103
The second case involving the NSPA was United States
v. McClain.104 More so than Hollinshead, McClain was poised
to send a real message to the art dealing community, holding
profound implications for art dealers, who were never before
criminally liable for their actions.105 The defendants were
“convicted by a jury of conspiring to transport, receive, and
sell stolen pre-Columbian artifacts” in violation of the NSPA.106
Joseph M. Rodriguez, one of the defendants, approached Adalina
Zambrano of the Mexican Cultural Institute in San Antonio,
Texas with a proposal to sell her various pre-Columbian
artifacts.107 Unfortunately for Rodriguez, the Institute was
an official part of the Mexican government, thus presumably
sealing the case against him for illegal importation.108 The other
four defendants were implicated in similar cases of attempting
to sell stolen pre-Columbian artifacts.109 The defendants did not
deny they knew the objects were illegally imported, but claimed
that because Mexico did not truly lay claim to all objects of
cultural significance within its borders, found or unfound, until
Criminal Law Brief

1972, they could rightfully claim ownership of the items.110 The
contested jury instruction, which formed the basis for the Fifth
Circuit’s reversal, read that:
[S]ince 1897 Mexican law has declared pre-Columbian
artifacts recovered from the Republic of Mexico
within its borders to be the property of the Republic
of Mexico, except in instances where the Government
of the Republic of Mexico has, by way of license or
permit, granted permission to private persons or parties
or others to receive and export in their possession such
artifacts to other places or other countries.111
The court first recognized that Mexico has a similar right
to make a claim under the NSPA as any state in the U.S.112 The
court then examined, as it did in Hollinshead, the trial judge’s
use of the word stolen in his jury instructions.113 The court spent
some time on this discussion before finally rejecting the defendants’ argument that property owned by a foreign government,
yet also capable of being privately owned through purchase or
discovery, is not stolen for the purposes of the NSPA.114 The
court evaluated the 1897 Mexican Law on Archaeological
Monuments, and found nothing to constitute a declaration of
ownership by the state.115 Similarly, it stated that the Mexican
1930 Law on the Protection and Conservation of Monuments
and Natural Beauty “implicitly recognized the right to private
ownership of monuments and expressly allowed monuments to
be freely alienated, subject to the government’s right of first
refusal.”116 The court found that both the 1934 and 1970 laws
allowed for private ownership of movables, even if they were
of cultural value.117 The 1972 law was the first instance the
court found where the Mexican government asserted its rights
to the cultural property in its borders.118 Thus, the court held that
“a declaration of national ownership is necessary before illegal
exportation of an article can be considered theft, and the
exported article ‘stolen,’ within the meaning of the [NSPA].”119
The court went on to hold that “the state’s power to regulate
is not ownership.”120 Applying the court’s logic, the following
conditions show the item was stolen: (i) if the export was after
1972, the artifact may have been stolen (if it was “not legitimately in the seller’s hands as a result of prior law”); (ii) if the
export was before 1972 but after 1934, then one would need
to show it “was found on or in an immovable archaeological
monument;” and (iii) if the export was before 1934, then the
object was not the property of the Mexican government, and
so illegal exportation would subject the receiver to prosecution
under the NSPA.121 Since the jury was not informed, it had
to determine when the objects were exported, then apply the
relevant Mexican law, the convictions were reversed, and the
case remanded.122 Ultimately, McClain is about the distinction
between “stolen” and “illegally exported” goods, which is the
difference between a criminal and civil penalty.123
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Hollinshead and McClain were not without their critics.
Some argued that the U.S. had improperly enforced the penal
laws and export regulations of other states.124 Just as significantly,
many detractors feared the decisions would bolster the black
markets in art-purchasing nations.125 Additionally, some were
troubled by the application of the NSPA to cultural property
theft in foreign countries,126
though as the McClain court
stated, “[I]t is not ‘unfair to
require that one who deliberately goes perilously close
to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that
he may cross the line.’”127
If Hollinshead and McClain
were controversial decisions,
Schultz would blow them out
of the water.

both Parry and Farag were arrested in Great Britain and Egypt,
respectively, for dealing in stolen antiquities.137 Though Parry
was in custody, he and Schultz continued to talk, discussing
the purchase and resale of ten limestone stele (inscribed
slabs), though neither obtained them.138 The court found Parry
and Schultz’s communications to be evidence that they were
aware of the legal risk of their
actions; the couple employed
“‘veiled terms,’ code, or languages other than English”
in their letters.139 Schultz was
found guilty on the sole count
and was sentenced to thirtythree months imprisonment on
June 11, 2002.140 Interestingly,
one can see the split in ideology between dealers/collectors
and archaeologists/preservationists in the series of amicus curiae
briefs submitted to the court.141
The first major issue the court tackled was the application
of the NSPA to cases implicating patrimony laws.142 Law 117,
Egypt’s patrimony law, enacted in 1983, required the registration
and recording of all privately owned antiquities in Egypt,
prohibited their removal from Egypt, and made the private
ownership or possession of antiquities after 1983 illegal.143
Parry and Schultz’s scheme involved buying “newly unearthed
antiquities at black market prices from tomb-raiders, building
contractors, and corrupt Egyptian officials.”144 Law 117 attached
criminal penalties to smuggling, theft, removal, counterfeiting,
unlawful dispossession, and defacement of antiquities.145 The
Second Circuit flatly rejected Schultz’s argument that Law 117
did not create an ownership right.146 The court stated that Law
117 is directed towards both “activities within Egypt as well as
the export of antiquities out of Egypt.”147 Though the Second
Circuit believed Schultz violated Egyptian law, it still needed
to determine whether Schultz violated the NSPA.148 The court
noted that the nationality of the owner of the stolen property has
no impact under the NSPA.149 Furthermore, the court cited its
own argument in United States v. Benson,150 which applied the
NSPA to cases where the person from whom the property was
stolen may not have been the true owner as the victim’s title
in the property may be irrelevant.151 Schultz persisted on
rejecting the Egyptian government’s ownership claim by rejecting the holding in McClain and conflicting with U.S. policy,
with the CPIA, and the common law definition of “stolen.”152
The court, in turn, agreed that the Fifth Circuit “found the proper
balancing tests between” “stolen” and “illegally exported.”153
The court found that U.S. policy was irrelevant here as Law
117 is a true ownership law,154 and cited the Senate Report on
the CPIA for support of its finding that the law functions as a
corollary to existing federal and state remedies, including theft
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B. THE CURIOUS CASE OF UNITED STATES
V. SCHULTZ
United States v. Schultz is the game changing moment in
domestic case law, providing for the criminal prosecution of an
art dealer, Frederick Schultz, who was “indicted on one count
for conspiracy to receive stolen Egyptian antiquities that had
been transported in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371” conspiracy to
commit offense or defraud the United States.128 Schultz argued
that the items he allegedly conspired to receive could not be
stolen, as they were not owned by anybody.129 The prosecution
countered that the Egyptian government’s patrimony law, Law
117, “declared all antiquities found in Egypt after 1983 to be the
property of the Egyptian government.130
Jonathan Tokeley Parry, a British national, showed
Schultz a photo of “an ancient sculpture of the head of Pharaoh
Amenhotep III,” and claimed he obtained the sculpture in Egypt
from a building contractor via a middleman, Ali Farag.131 To
smuggle the sculpture out of Egypt, Parry coated it with plastic to make it appear like a cheap souvenir, then removed the
plastic in England.132 Schultz offered Parry a large amount of
money to be the agent in the sale of the sculpture, which Parry
agreed to, and the two subsequently established a false provenance for the item to better sell it.133 When the men were unable
to find a buyer, Schultz purchased the sculpture for $800,000,
and later sold it to a private collector for $1.2 million.134 By mid1995, Robin Symes had acquired the sculpture and requested
that Schultz provide him with further details as to the sculpture’s
origin, as the Egyptian government was pursuing it.135
Using the same method as with the Amenhotep sculpture,
Parry and Schultz smuggled more items out of Egypt; they did
this at least five more times from 1991-92, “under the false
provenance of the Thomas Alcock Collection.”136 In June 1994,
60
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and smuggling laws.155 Additionally, the court found Schultz’s
arguments concerning the common law definition of “stolen” to
be unpersuasive.156 Schultz raised an additional argument concerning mistake of U.S. law, as he was unaware that violations
of Law 117 were subject to criminal penalties domestically
under the NSPA, the court rejected his reasoning, noting that the
NSPA does not include the term “willfully,” and only requires
knowledge that the goods were “stolen, unlawfully converted,
or taken.”157 Schultz raised two additional claims: 1) regarding
the “conscious avoidance” jury instruction,158 and 2) the admittance of evidence by the state concerning other individuals’
in the antiquities trade’s personal knowledge of the Law 117
(including his former assistant).159 The former was rejected as
the instruction was accurate enough, and the latter was rejected
on the grounds that the testimony was relevant.160
The primary holding from Schultz was that “the NSPA
applies to property that is stolen from a foreign government,
where that government asserts actual ownership of the property
pursuant to a valid patrimony law.”161 Furthermore, Schultz
established what had long been suspected in the American legal
system: the CPIA and the NSPA are not mutually exclusive.162 In
the aftermath of Schultz, museums began to change their attitudes
towards looted antiquities.163 The rule denying deliberate avoidance, a tactic long used by art dealers to trade items on the black
market, also changed the game; now provenance would have to
be established for a museum or collector to feel comfortable in its
acquisition. Provenance was more clearly established and many
museums voluntarily repatriated artifacts they found to be looted.
The NSPA is not the only vehicle for criminal prosecution, however, and individuals who have attempted to get around it have
found themselves subject to prosecution by more creative means.

C. CLEVERNESS—ALTERNATIVE ROUTES
TO PROSECUTION
While the NSPA provided the prosecutorial grounds for
the majority of stolen art cases in the United States, including
Schultz, this was not the only means to prosecution. This Part
briefly discusses some of the alternate methods used to obtain a
conviction in an international art theft case.
Since the NSPA applies to archaeological artifacts stolen
from “nations with statutes vesting ownership of the objects
in the state,” it would not apply to a bona fide purchaser of
the objects, who bought them in good faith, trusting their provenance.164 Sometimes the prosecutor can bring a case under the
NSPA when the scienter is less clear, such as in the case of
Joe T. Meador, a soldier during World War II who stole the
Quedlinburg treasures after the war and brought them home to
Texas.165 After he died, the German government discovered the
family was trying to sell the treasures, and rather than pursue
the prosecution, requested the U.S. government drop the case
and instead reached a settlement for $2.75 million.166 Another
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case, Peru v. Johnson,167 showed the difficulty of establishing
that artifacts were illegally excavated.168 The case placed on
the claimant a difficult standard of proof—that of the object’s
geographical origin—and may be the reason claimants found it
so difficult to bring an NSPA case after McClain until Schultz.169
However, in light of this limitation, the U.S. uses other means
to prosecute art thieves; mail and wire fraud statutes, for
example, were used in Center Art Galleries-Hawaii Inc. v.
United States.170 In Snider v. Lone Star Art Trading Co.,171
a combination of individuals and corporation were held to
be in violation of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) by misrepresenting the value
of art plates in order to sell them.172 Finally, in United States
v. Clack,173 the court convicted and fined the defendant
$1,008,000 under both the NSPA and the Hobbs Act for “a
series of burglaries and robberies of antique art, paintings,
Oriental rugs, and jewelry.”174
These cases show that while the NSPA was difficult to
enforce in cases of art theft, it was still possible to use domestic
statutes to obtain a conviction of forgers, defrauders, and
thieves. Schultz reaffirmed the right of foreign states to their
own cultural property. While this began the move towards
fixing the inherent problems in the art trade, it would take
one more case for the message to sink in.

IV. AMERICAN OUTLAWS—THE GETTY’S
GAME WITH THE BLACK MARKET
The period from 1970 to 2003 saw a gradual shift in
attitude towards recognizing patrimony claims and the need to
establish provenance. The threat of criminal prosecution for
international art theft hung heavily over the heads of dealers,
museum directors, and private collectors. On the other side,
archaeologists, researchers, and states cheered as they saw
a victory in Schultz, a step towards ridding them of the plague
of theft and destruction of their archaeological digs.
This was clearly not the end of the black market, however.
Old guard American museums such as the Met and the Getty
were loath to part with artifacts in their collections, whether or
not the patrimony claims were legitimate.175 This Section briefly
examines the importation of stolen art to the Getty, as well as
the subsequent trial of Marion True and its impact on the nature
of museum acquisitions today. This Section relies entirely on
the account of the case by Jason Felch and Ralph Frammolino
in their book, Chasing Aphrodite,176 as it is arguably the best
and only authoritative source in English on this particular case.

A. CRIME
The J. Paul Getty Museum in Malibu, California was
initially conceived as a tax shelter for J. Paul Getty; a place
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to store his art collection and receive a sizeable tax deduction
in return.177 The acquisition of art as a tax incentive later came
back to haunt the Getty, but at that time, the collection was
barely open to the public.178 After Getty’s death, he left the
museum nearly $700 million in Getty Oil stock, which rapidly
transformed the collection from the tax break of an oilman to
“the richest art institution in the world.”179 The endowment in
turn led to the Getty’s first questionable acquisition, a bronze
statue of an athlete later named “the Getty Bronze.”180
The Getty, now the richest art museum, was also arguably
the most entrenched museum in the illegal art trade.181 Former
antiquities curator, Jiri Frel, used the museum as a tax shelter for
the Hollywood elite, establishing a scheme whereby he would
have the rich and famous buy antiquities of all manner, including
shards and smaller items, for a relatively low cost from a
dealer.182 He would then inflate the value of the item through
his appraisal (initially by actual treatment and restoration of the
item, later by the simple stroke of a pen) and had the owner
donate the item to the museum for a massive tax write-off.183
These acquisitions, however, were not the source of the Getty’s
ultimate troubles; those were the result of Marion True’s actions
during her stint as antiquities curator.184
In 1986, True began a business relationship with Robin
Symes, a dealer, who introduced her to the source of True’s
downfall, a cult statue from a Greek temple, likely Aphrodite,
at the cost of $24 million.185 Meanwhile, True and John Walsh,
the director of the Getty, drafted a memo stating, “We believe
we should go beyond what is demanded by the law . . . and
abide by the highest possible ethical standards in our collection
policy.”186 The Aphrodite had a highly suspect provenance187
and though the Getty requested information about the statue,
the purchase was authorized a week before the Italian Ministry
of Culture reported it had no information about the statue.188
However, upon debuting the statue and receiving criticism from
the Italian government, the Getty stated that it would return the
statue if the Italians could mount a credible claim.189 Further
acquisitions were made of similar questionable provenance, yet
by 1998, Marion True had emerged as a beacon of museum
reform, calling for an end to the justifications for acquiring
looted antiquities.190 Meanwhile, the Italian police launched
an investigation through the art squad of the Carabinieri, leading to the arrest of the dealer Giacomo Medici and in October
1999, a request for strict import quotas brought via the CPIA.191
In her testimony in the CPIA hearing, True said that the
“suggestions of some that it was better to have illicit antiquities
on well-tended American shelves than to let the careless Italians
keep them in dusty exhibits” was improper. American museums
were equally careless.192 However, the contents of Medici’s
warehouse were shipped to the Italian art police, which led to a
rather devastating deposition of True.193 This would prove to be
the beginning of the end.
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B. PUNISHMENT
The ruling in Schultz changed the face of museum
acquisitions and made very real the threat of domestic criminal
prosecution. Yet the Italian police wanted to fully impress upon
American museums the consequences of illegal acquisitions,
and end the practice once and for all.194 Through the 2002 arrest
of art dealer, Frieda Tchakos, the investigators learned about
the donation of several looted items to the Getty, effectively a
laundering scheme on par with Frel’s.195 The Italians established
a case against Medici, True, and another art dealer they both
worked with, Robert Hecht.196
Medici’s trial began in December 2003; it was severed from
the trials of his alleged co-conspirators.197 Medici was found
guilty in December 2004 for antiquities trafficking of objects
looted from Italy.198 Though True’s preliminary hearing took
a year and a half, she was ultimately indicted for trafficking
looted antiquities on April 1, 2005 and ordered to stand trial in
Rome.199 The Getty announced her “retirement” on October 1,
2005.200 By 2007, the Getty returned forty-six artifacts including
the Aphrodite (though not the Getty Bronze), purchased over
thirty years, worth nearly $40 million dollars.201 Meanwhile,
True had been protesting her innocence, but it was too late.202
The criminal case in Italy continued; however, the prosecutor
stated he had no intention of putting her in jail, and offered a
speedy conclusion provided True admit her wrongdoing.203 She
was simultaneously facing a criminal trial in Greece time for
similar charges, though the Greek government dropped the case
after the statute of limitations expired in November 2007.204
True’s criminal trial in Italy was finally dismissed without
verdict in October 2010, when the statute of limitations expired
on those criminal charges.205
The trial of Marion True in a foreign court was the final
straw that broke down the old guard and led to a new wave
of museum acquisitions. The Italian prosecutor stated that
“[h]is goal had been to change the behavior of American
museums, and that battle had been won . . . . Marion True
had been collateral damage, a means to an end.”206 This rather
drastic outcome did, however, lead to the steady repatriation of
cultural artifacts from museums in the U.S. to Italy and Greece,
which culminated, in the Getty’s case, with the shipment of the
Aphrodite—which may not have been Aphrodite at all207—back
to Italy in December 2010 where it remains in a museum outside
the ruins of Morgantina, where it was first stolen.208

V. CONCLUSION
The world of antiquities acquisitions has changed. Art theft
has by no means diminished;209 however, now it has a diminished role in the United States.210 While some have protested
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this cultural shift,211 it has largely been accepted by American
museums.212 The combination of the NSPA, the CPIA, Schultz,
and the trial of Marion True have sent the sternest possible message to museums, dealers, and private collectors of antiquities
in the U.S.: art theft is not tolerated in this country. The black
market in looted treasures will persist, as it always has, but
for now, the major museums in the U.S. are backing away
and choosing instead to display valuable artifacts from other
countries via long-term loans.
Of course, the U.S. is not the only major art-purchasing
nation. The U.K., France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Japan,
Canada, and China all have purchased objects of questionable
provenance, or otherwise acquired them through looting in
imperial times.213 The change in the U.S. is important; it shows
that Americans are capable of respecting the international
community and its history. However, this does not change the
controversy over the Elgin marbles, still in the British Museum,
or the hundreds of sculptures in the Louvre still subject to
patrimony claims. While domestic criminal law has worked in
the United States by punishing offenders and recognizing the
problem of stolen art, selling stolen artifacts on the black market
remains as good a source of income today as it was for the crew
of the Ferrucio Ferri when they discovered the Getty Bronze.
Hope can be found in the words of J. Paul Getty,
To me my works of art are all vividly alive. They’re
the embodiment of whoever created them—a mirror of
their creator’s hopes, dreams and frustrations….They
have led eventful lives—pampered by the aristocracy
and pillaged by revolution, courted with ardour and
cold-bloodedly abandoned. They have been honored
by drawing rooms and humbled by attics. So many
worlds in their lifespan, yet all were transitory. What
stories they could tell, what sights they must have
seen! Their worlds have long since disintegrated, yet
they live on.214
By preserving provenance, we preserve our shared history,
keeping the story true and giving these precious and historic
works of art new life, a more priceless undertaking than profit.
The black market in looted antiquities will continue until such
a time as both art-purchasing and especially art-rich countries
recognize their shared responsibility in protecting the world’s
cultural heritage from the dangers of looting, and preserve
them for posterity so that future generations can understand
their history.

An Egyptian papyrus from 1100 B.C., now ironically in the British
Museum, provided the details of the trials of robbers attempting to steal
from the pharaohs’ tombs. The Abbott Papyrus, the British mUseUm,
http://www.britishmuseum.org/explore/highlights/highlight_objects/aes/t/
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the_abbott_papyrus.aspx (last visited Feb. 8, 2011) (noting tomb robberies
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taking of the friezes from the Parthenon in Greece (now called the Elgin
marbles) and their subsequent removal to Britain, where they are on display
in the British Museum today, by Thomas Bruce, Seventh Earl of Elgin, also
known as Lord Elgin. See id. at 2-3 (describing the British Parliament’s
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3
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4
See Clemency Coggins, Archeology and the Art Market, 175 sCi. 263,
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a foreign government if that government asserts ownership to that property
pursuant to a patrimony law).
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21
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22
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frammolino, supra note 1, at 97-98; see also Leah E. Eisen, Commentary,
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23
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id., at note 9 (citing Deborah Pugh et al., The Greed That Is Tearing History
Out By Its Roots, gUardian at 13 (1992) (noting that antiquities trafficking
in Peru is almost as profitable as the cocaine trade but with fewer risks).
24
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Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, 231 [hereinafter UNESCO Convention].
25
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Borodkin, supra note 1, at 388.
27
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28
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nations have standing to bring lawsuits in the jurisdictions of other member
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exempting “export during the lifetime of the [creator] or within a period of
fifty years following” that person’s death when the “cultural object was made
by a member or members of a tribal or indigenous community for traditional
or ritual use by that community” and ensuring the object’s return in that
circumstance).
73
18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-15 (2006).
74
See Jennifer Anglim Kreder, The Choice Between Civil and Criminal
Remedies in Stolen Art Litigation, 38 vand. J. transnat’l l. 1199, 1206
(2005) (discussing the history of the NSPA).
75
See § 2314 (providing a fine and/or imprisonment for no more than ten
years for someone found guilty of violating the section).
54

65

See § 2315 (providing a fine and/or imprisonment for no more than ten
years for someone found guilty of violating the section).
77
See Kreder, supra note 74, at 1206 (discussing the bases of prosecution
for international art theft in the United States).
78
See Eisen, supra note 22, at 1068 n.14 (explaining that the lack of
success is due in part because the property must fall within the United
States’ narrow definition of the word stolen).
79
Kreder, supra note 74, at 1206 (noting that the government must show
that the violation was intentional).
80
See id. at 1207 (noting that “dealers and auction houses take very few
measures to verify the provenance of the artwork.”) (quoting Claudia Fox,
Note, The UNDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural
Objects: An Answer to the World Problem of Illicit Trade in Cultural
Property, 9 am. U. J. int’l l. & Pol’y 225, 233 (1993)).
81
Id. See generally felCh & frammolino, supra note 1, at 17-25 (discussing
the acquisition of numerous pieces by the Getty through often questionable
provenance claims, ultimately leading to the prosecution of Marion True
in Italy).
82
See e.g., United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir.
1974) (applying the NSPA to the transportation of stolen goods from Central
America to the United States); United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 409
(2d Cir. 2003) (clarifying the roles of the NSPA and CPIA in domestic
enforcement of cultural property patrimony claims in a criminal theft claim).
83
Schultz, 333 F.3d at 409.
84
See Borodkin, supra note 1, at 396 (noting that “[f]ederal mail fraud,
wire fraud, credit card fraud, and tax fraud provisions, as well as unifying
criminal conspiracy laws have occasionally been employed in the art context.”).
85
Schultz, 333 F.3d at 410 (concluding that NSPA “applies to property
that is stolen in violation of a foreign patrimony law” and that “CPIA is not
the exclusive means of dealing with stolen artifacts and antiquities.”).
86
See Clemency Coggins, Illicit Traffic of Pre-Columbian Antiquities, 29
art JoUrnal 94, 94 (1969) (noting the destruction of digs and cultural sites
in Guatemala and Mexico as part of the quest for fuel to feed the art market).
87
United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154, 1154 (9th Cir. 1974);
United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 992 (5th Cir. 1977) (reversing
defendants’ conviction for conspiracy to violate the NSPA).
88
Hollinshead, 495 F.2d at 1154.
89
Id. at 1155.
90
Id. (noting that the stele was a very rare item).
91
See id. (describing the use of bribes to Guatemalan officers to ensure
the package was exported without any hassle).
92
See id. (noting that Fell and Dwyer, another conspirator, stele traveled from
“Decatur, Georgia, to New York City, to Wisconsin and to Raleigh, North
Carolina” before winding up with Hollinshead, who attempted to sell it).
93
See United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154, 1155-56 (9th Cir.
1974) (noting that “[i]t would have been astonishing if the jury had found
that they did not know the stele was stolen.”).
94
Id. at 1155 (dismissing claims relating to the sufficiency of the
evidence).
95
Id.
96
See 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2006) (concerning transportation of stolen
items).
97
Hollinshead, 495 F.2d at 1156 (quoting the judge’s jury instruction).
98
Id. (objecting to the instruction that the jury “must find beyond a
reasonable doubt that appellants knew the stele was stolen).
99
See id. (citing McAbee v. United States, 434 F.2d 361, 362 (9th Cir.
1970)).
100
See id. (citing Pugliano v. United States, 348 F.2d 902, 903 (1st Cir.
1965)).
101
Id.
76
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United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1974) (noting
that the court felt it was unlikely the jury questioned the instruction insofar
as it referenced Guatemalan law).
103
Kreder, supra note 74, at 1208. Interestingly, this case began as a civil
suit brought by the Guatemalan government, which was dropped when the
U.S. attorney began criminal proceedings. Id.
104
United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 988 (5th Cir. 1977).
105
The amicus curiae brief from the American Association of Dealers in
Ancient, Oriental, and Primitive Art stated that “merely by dealing in art
work that have originated albeit many years earlier in countries whose laws
include broad declarations of national ownership in art, [dealers] will be open
to charges of receiving and transporting stolen property in violation of federal
criminal law.” McClain, 545 F.2d at 991. While the brief also argued for the
public’s right to view art in the United States, clearly the bigger fear was
criminal prosecution of dealers, museum directors, and private collectors for
failing to establish the provenance of works in their collections. Id.
106
McClain, 545 F.2d at 992.
107
Id. at 992-93.
108
See id. at 993 (stating that Zambrano was able to identify through
photographs several of the items Rodriguez had shown her).
109
See id. (stating defendants Simpson and Bradshaw attempted to sell
artifacts they knew were stolen to McGauley and an informer).
110
See United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 993 (5th Cir. 1977)
(discussing Dr. Gertz’s testimony that Mexico’s laws have protected
its cultural heritage since 1897, including registration and export permit
requirements established in 1934, through which only fifty to seventy
permits have been issued. The defendants did not register their artifacts or
obtain export permits).
111
Id. at 994.
112
See id. (noting that 18 U.S.C.§§ 2314, 2315 (2006) refer to both
interstate commerce and foreign commerce).
113
See id. at 993-94 (“[S]tolen means acquired or possessed as a result
of some wrongful or dishonest act of taking, whereby a person willfully
obtains or retains possession of property which belongs to another, without
or beyond any permission given, and with the intent to deprive the benefits
of ownership and use.”).
114
See id. at 997 (“[W]e cannot say that the intent of any statute, treaty,
or general policy of encouraging the importation of art more than 100
years old was to narrow the National Stolen Property Act so as to make it
inapplicable to art objects or artifacts declared to be the property of another
country and illegally imported into this country.”).
115
See id. at 997-98 (noting that the l897 law did intend to declare archaeological monuments were property of the state but distinguished antiquities
and other movable objects).
116
See United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 998 (5th Cir. 1977)
(describing that nothing in the 1930 law contained a declaration of ownership
by the government).
117
See id. at 998-99 (explaining that governmental ownership was limited
to “artifacts found in or on immovable monuments”).
118
See id. at 1000 (noting that only after the effective date of the 1972
law would the Mexican government have had ownership of the artifacts in
question).
119
Id. at 1000-01. Notably, the court argues,
If . . . an object were considered ‘stolen’ merely because it was illegally
exported, the meaning of the term ‘stolen’ would be stretched beyond its
conventional meaning. Although ‘stealing’ is not a term of art, it is also
not a word bereft of meaning. It should not be expanded at the government’s will beyond the connotation—depriving an owner of its rights in
property—conventionally called to mind.
Id. at 1002. This is a fine point to make, though not one without meaning, as
it effectively separates the customs violation of illegal export with outright
theft, as someone could theoretically violate a country’s export laws while
102
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maintaining full title to the property that was exported. Essentially, the
court is trying to distinguish between ownership and possession to ensure
that criminal penalties are not imposed when they are not required. United
States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 1002 (5th Cir. 1977).
120
Id. at 1002.
121
Id. at 1003 (providing a summary of the court’s conclusions).
122
See id. (noting that the jury was the only body who could properly
determine when the object was exported; holding otherwise would violate
the defendants’ right to a trial by jury).
123
Contra Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34
stan. l. rev. 275, 350-51 (1982) (arguing that McClain erodes the distinction between “stolen” and “illegally exported.” Bator states, “A blanket
legislative declaration of state ownership of all antiquities, discovered and
undiscovered, without more, is an abstraction—it makes little difference in
the real world. Yet McClain gives this abstraction dramatic weight: Illegal
export, after the adoption of the declaration, suddenly becomes ‘theft.’
The exporting country, without affecting any real changes at home, can
thus invoke the criminal legislation of the United States to help enforce
its export rules by simply waving a magic wand and promulgating this
meta-physical declaration of ownership.”).
124
See Kreder, supra note 74, at 1211 (noting some of the criticism of
the Hollinshead and McClain decisions).
125
See id. at 1212 (stating that enforcement of “foreign law criminalizing
the export of any and all artifacts, rather than . . . a narrower class of
objects, would generate a black market in ‘art hungry’ nations.”); see also
United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir.
1999) (stating that McClain adopted a broad definition of property under
the NSPA, but declining to address the issue).
126
See Kreder, supra note 74, at 1212 (noting that many believed the
NSPA to apply to domestic organized crime among the several states,
rather than international crime).
127
See United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d, 988, 1002 n.30 (citing Boyce
Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952)).
128
See United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 395 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting the
underlying offense was a violation of the NSPA under 18 U.S.C. § 2315).
129
Id. at 396 (arguing that the items were not stolen within the meaning
of the NSPA).
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
See id. (noting the culprits claimed one of Parry’s relatives brought the
sculpture from Egypt in the 1920s and kept it in a private collection, the
“Thomas Alcock Collection,” since that time).
134
United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 396 (2d Cir. 2003)
135
See id. (noting that Schultz requested information on the Egyptian
claim, but did not provide additional information on the sculpture’s
provenance).
136
Id. at 396. Some of the items brought out of Egypt may have been fakes,
including a sculpture of Meryet Anum, a daughter of Pharaoh Ramses II,
and a sculpture Parry called “The Offeror.” Id. at 396-97. The Offeror
was confiscated from Parry by British authorities, and although Schultz
faked an invoice to show it was his, he was unable to reclaim it. Id. at 397.
Parry and Farag were eventually able to bribe corrupt Egyptian antiquities
police officers, paying off some of their debts in exchange for antiquities
in police possession, including one item that still had a partial Egyptian
government registry number, despite Parry’s attempts to remove it. United
States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 2003). The final item noted
is “a limestone sculpture of a striding figure,” named “George,” obtained
from Egyptian villagers. Id. at 397. The men used the same Thomas Alcock
Collection scheme to try to sell it, but when Schultz could not sell it in New
York, it was sent to Switzerland, where Parry was not able to retrieve it for
reasons that remain unclear. Id. at 397.
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Id. at 397-98 (noting that both men were charged with dealing in stolen
antiquities).
138
Id. at 398 (detailing Parry and Schultz’s plans to make additional
acquisitions even after Parry’s arrest).
139
United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 398 (2d Cir. 2003).
140
Id. (noting that Schultz received a thirty-three-month imprisonment for
his conviction).
141
Id. Pro-Schultz briefs were from parties such as The National
Association of Dealers in Ancient, Oriental & Primitive Art, Inc., The Art
Dealers Association of America, and The American Society of Appraisers.
Briefs that opposed Schultz included parties such as The American
Anthropological Association, The Society for American Archaeology, and
the Archaeological Institute of America. Id.
142
Id.
143
United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 395 (2d Cir. 2003). Indeed,
Article 7 of Law 117 outlaws the trade in Egyptian antiquities outright. Id.
at 399.
144
See Kreder, supra note 74, at 1213 (explaining that Parry and Schultz
“needed the objects to be from an unpublished tomb, so that the Egyptian
Government could not identify them as having been removed from Egypt
in the recent past.”).
145
See Schultz, 333 F.3d at 400 (noting the maximum criminal penalty
is for smuggling, requiring a fine between 5,000 and 50,000 pounds and
a prison sentence with hard labor; the minimum criminal penalty is for
defacement, imposing a prison term of three to twelve months and/or a fine
of 100 to 500 pounds).
146
Id. at 398-403. The court relied on the opinions of Dr. Gaballa Ali
Gaballa, Secretary General of Egypt’s Supreme Council of Antiquities,
who clearly stated that the Egyptian government owns all newly discovered
antiquities, and several people had been prosecuted within Egypt from
violating Law 117 (where the violations were entirely within Egypt). Id.
at 400-01. The court also heard from General Ali El Sobky, the Director
of Criminal Investigations for the Egyptian Antiquities Police, who stated
that most cases concern antiquities trafficking within Egypt, and even in
the case of acquittal, the item is retained by the Egyptian government. Id. at
401. Contra id. at 401 (citing UCLA Law Professor Khaled Abou El Fadl’s
testimony that Law 117 never established Egypt’s clear ownership rights,
though he admittedly never practiced in Egypt).
147
United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 402 (2d Cir. 2003) (concluding
that Law 117 was “clear and unambiguous”).
148
See id. at 399 (stating that the object still must fall within the NSPA’s
definition of “stolen”).
149
See id. at 402 (citing United States v. Frazier, 584 F.2d 790, 794
(6th Cir. 1978)).
150
United States v. Benson, 548 F.2d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1977).
151
See Schultz, 333 F.3d at 402 (citing Benson, supra note 150, at 46).
152
Id. at 403 (summarizing Shultz’s argument that the holding in McClain
should be rejected “based on current Second Circuit precedent . . .”).
Note that the court had earlier stated that the goods were “stolen” if “the
antiquities [Schultz] conspired to receive in the United States belonged to
someone who did not give consent for Schultz (or his agent) to take them.”
Id. at 399.
153
Id. at 404. The court supported this ruling with the holding in
Hollinshead. See id. at 404 (“[A]n object is ‘stolen’ within the meaning
of the NSPA if it is taken in violation of a patrimony law.”). But see id.
at 405 (“The Second Circuit has rarely addressed McClain, and has never
decided whether the holding of McClain is the law in this Circuit.”). The
court went on to reject Schultz’s interpretation of the holdings in United
States v. Long Cove Seafood, Inc., 582 F.2d 159, 163, 165 (2d Cir. 1978),
which cited McClain, 545 F.2d at 163, in a positive light, and United States
v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1999), which is
irrelevant. United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 405-07 (2d Cir. 2003).
137
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See id. at 408 (noting that Law 117 is not limited only to export
restrictions).
155
See id. (citing S. Rep. No. 97-564, at 22 (1982)). Indeed, the court
reasons that the fact that both a civil remedy under the CPIA and a criminal
remedy under the NSPA may exist does not “limit the reach of the NSPA.”
Id. at 409 (stating that “the CPIA is an import law not a criminal law.”).
156
Id. at 409-10 (noting the Supreme Court has held the NSPA to apply to
a broader class of crimes than those contemplated by the common law).
157
See id. at 411 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (2006)). Concerning Schultz’s
mistake of Egyptian law, the court noted that “if a jury finds that a
defendant knew all of the relevant facts, the defendant cannot then escape
liability by contending that he did not know the law.” See id. (noting that
Schultz was knowingly participating in a conspiracy to smuggle antiquities
out of Egypt, and smuggling is not a legal activity).
158
United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 412-13 (2d Cir. 2003). The jury
instructions stated, A defendant may not purposefully remain ignorant of
either facts or the law in order to escape the consequences of the law . . .
deliberate avoidance of positive knowledge [is treatable as] the equivalent
of such knowledge, unless you find the defendant actually believed that the
antiquities were not the property of the Egyptian government.
Id. at 413.
159
See id. at 416 (noting that determination of relevancy was for the
discretion of the trial court; that determination will stand an absent abuse
of discretion).
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
See id. at 410 (remarking that extending the NSPA to stolen artifacts
does not conflict with United States policy).
163
See felCh & frammolino, supra note 1, at 228 (describing that “four
German antiquities museums agreed to adopt strict guidelines forbidding
the acquisition of undocumented ancient art.”). But see id. at 232 (quoting
Giuseppe Proietti, a senior Culture Ministry official in Italy, who described
the Getty and Met as “rogue museums” due to their known involvement
with art traffickers).
164
Kreder, supra note 74, at 1218-19.
165
See id. at 1219 (The Quedlinburg treasures were a ‘trove of gold, silver
and bejeweled medieval manuscripts [hidden in a cave during the war] near
the Quedlenburg Cathedral, their home for the previous 1,000 years.’ One
such treasure covered with precious stones is believed to have belonged to
Henry I. The treasures have been described as ‘one of the most important
collections of religious art of the Middle Ages.’).
166
Id. at 1219-20. But see id. at 1220 (noting that Meador was courtmartialed in 1945 for stealing valuable French china from a chateau).
167
See Gov’t of Peru v. Johnson, 720 F. Supp. 810, 812 (C.D. Cal. 1989)
aff’d sub nom. Gov’t of Peru v. Wendt, 933 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1991)
(holding that Peru couldn’t establish that the artifacts were illegally
excavated because it was unclear when they were unearthed or from what
country they were from).
168
Borodkin, supra note 1, at 395 (noting the difficulties in establishing
the elements in a NSPA prosecution).
169
Id. at 395-96 (describing the rule in Johnson, 720 F. Supp. at 810,
places claimant nations in an evidentiary Catch-22; if the claimant had the
ability to police all the archaeological sites in its borders, it would not have
to seek an NSPA suit as the object would never leave the country).
170
See Center Art Galleries—Hawaii, Inc. v. United States, 875 F.2d 747,
747 (9th Cir. 1989) (involving the sale of a forged Salvador Dali painting);
Borodkin, supra note 1, at 396 (noting that defendants were convicted under
mail and wire fraud statutes to three years and thirty months, respectively,
for selling forged prints).
171
Snider v. Lone Star Art Tracing Co., 672 F. Supp. 977, 979 (E.D. Mich.
1987) (denying all but one of the defendants’ motions for reconsideration
and allowing the plaintiff to file an amended complaint).
154
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See Borodkin, supra note 1, at 396 (noting that the defendants attempted
to argue that their actions did not constitute the separate acts required for a
“pattern” of behavior required for a RICO violation); see also Faircloth v.
Finesod, 938 F.2d 513, 514 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding defendants liable for
triple damages under RICO for giving out fraudulent estimates of a Picasso
“art master” (template for making reproductions) and obtaining a fraudulent
opinion letter stating the art masters could be used as tax shelters).
173
United States v. Clack, 957 F.2d 659, 660 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that
the jury rejected the defendant’s insanity defense).
174
See Borodkin, supra note 1, at 397 (“If a claimant could show
that smuggler used force in the course of trafficking, the Hobbs Act could
possibly apply to international cases as well.”).
175
felCh & frammolino, supra note 1, at 181-83 (regarding the Met’s
repatriation battle with the Italian government over a collection of ancient
silver vessels and other artifacts).
176
See id. at 111.
177
See id. at 20-21 (noting that the idea for the museum came from Getty’s
long-time accountant).
178
See id. at 21 (noting that museum hours were from Wednesday
to Friday, 3 to 5 PM, with required reservations for the parking lot).
179
See id. at 25 (describing the exuberance of the museum employees after
learning of Getty’s bequest to the museum).
180
See id. (noting that the museum board unanimously agreed to the $3.95
million dollar purchase price, even though Getty himself had recently
refused to pay such a price). The Getty Bronze was discovered somewhere
in the Adriatic by the crew of the fishing trawler Ferrucio Ferri in 1964.
felCh & frammolino, supra note 1, at 9-10. It was brought back to the
town of Fano, Italy and moved to the captain’s cousin’s house, who invited
local dealers to inspect it. Id. at 10-11. They rejected offers of up to one
million lire, demanding more, and buried the statue in a cabbage field
to prevent its discovery. Id. at 11. It was shown to Giacomo Barbetti, a
wealthy antiquarian, a month later, and he proclaimed that it was the work
of Lysippus, a famous ancient Greek sculptor (the personal sculptor of
Alexander the Great). Id. at 12. The authors surmise that the Getty Bronze
was likely taken in raids by Romans of the Greek mainland and islands
around the beginning of the first millennium AD. Id. at 11-12. Barbetti
purchased the statue for 3.5 million lire, approximately $4,000, split among
the crew (the captain received $1,600, double his monthly wage). felCh &
frammolino, supra note 1, at 12. Barbetti moved the statue to a church in
Gubbio where it was hidden by the church priest under a red velvet curtain
in the sacristy, until the stench became unbearable and the priest moved it
to his home, submerging it in salt water. Id. at 12. From there, the story gets
murky. By the time the Carabinieri, the Italian national police, showed up,
it was gone to Milan, France, or even a monastery in Brazil. Id. at 12-13.
Though the Italian government filed criminal charges against Barbetti and
the priest for violating Italian cultural property law (all objects found after
1939 are objects of the state, and possessors of such objects are guilty of
theft) in 1966, the case was eventually dismissed for lack of evidence. Id.
at 13. The statue emerged in London three years later, apparently hidden
in the Brazilian monastery before being sold for $700,000 to Artemis, a
Luxembourg-based art consortium. Id. German antiquities dealer Heinz
Herzer, a member of Artemis, shipped the statue to his studio in Munich,
carefully removing the detritus that was encrusting it and taking painstaking steps to ensure its preservation. felCh & frammolino, supra note 1,
at 13. Herzer also concluded the statue to be the work of Lysippus, and
obtained the expert opinion of Bernard Ashmole, curator of Greek and
Roman art at the British Museum, to back up this claim. Id. at 14. Ashmole
discussed selling the statue to J. Paul Getty, but he refused to buy it unless
there were assurances regarding its legal status and provenance as well as
a five-year money-back guarantee in the event of a patrimony claim. Id.
at 20. Around the same time, German and Italian police raided Herzer’s
studio in Munich, questioning him about the statue’s journey, and he only
172

Spring 2012

escaped arrest when German authorities refused to extradite him to Italy to
be prosecuted for trafficking looted art. Id. With Getty’s death, the museum
was no longer “required” to establish provenance, and readily bought the
statue for $3.95 million, without permission from Italian authorities. felCh &
frammolino, supra note 1, at 25. The Getty Bronze was shipped from London
to Boston, quietly exhibited in the Denver Art Museum to avoid California
taxes, before it went to the Getty in mid-November 1977. Id. This remarkable
story illustrates only part of the depth of the smuggling scheme employed by
dealers and purchasers of art to acquire valuable and exquisite items.
181
See id. at 195-202 (noting the Italian government’s investigation
concerning looted artifacts, many of which were considered to be among
The Getty’s best pieces).
182
See id. at 32 (mentioning that the scheme “might even be legal”).
183
See id. at 32-37, 49-50 (noting that this tax fraud scheme resulted in over
a hundred donors giving six thousand antiquities valued at $14.7 million over
four years. The authors further note that Frel would enter the museum with
items stuffed in his pockets and that “a number of donations came through
Frel’s new wife.”). Frel was put on leave in 1984, resigned in 1986, and the
story about the tax fraud broke in 1987. felCh & frammolino, supra note 1,
at 81-82.
184
See id. at 111-158 (detailing “The Temptation of Marion True”).
185
See id. at 84-87 (explaining this was twice the cost of another questionable acquisition by the Getty, a kouros or Greek statue of a young boy with
one foot forward as if in an Egyptian painting, and more than had ever been
paid for a work of ancient art till then).
186
See id. at 91 (remarking that this policy ultimately led to the Getty
justifying its purchase of looted antiquities).
187
See id. at 88 (discussing Iris Love’s appraisal of the statue. He stated,
“Anybody who knows about southern Italian sculpture is going to know it
came from Italy . . . . Italy doesn’t have a statue of this size and of this style,
and there aren’t any statues in any European or American museum like it .
. . . I beg you, don’t buy it. You will only have troubles and problems.”).
188
There is evidence to suggest that the Getty knew the statue was stolen.
Harold Williams, the CEO of the Getty stated on September 2, 1987, “We
know it’s stolen . . . We know Symes is a fence.” felCh & frammolino,
supra note 1, at 89.
189
See id. at 107 (noting that the Getty would be “obligated to return the
piece regardless of the statute of limitations.”).
190
See id. at 164 (noting that True, at a 1998 conference at Rutgers
University, claimed that “[t]he Getty had abandoned its acquisitive past.”).
191
See id. at 169-76, 183 (noting that Medici had kept thirty albums of
Polaroids documenting all of items he had trafficked during his career).
After stolen items were identified, the Getty returned several antiquities
to Italy as a sign of good faith. Id. at 176-79 (noting the return of a vase, a
sculpture, and a bust).
192
felCh & frammolino, supra note 1, at 185; see also id. at 190-91
(“Experience has taught me that in reality, if serious efforts to establish a
clear pedigree for the object’s recent past prove futile, it is most likely—if
not certain—that it is the product of the illicit trade and we must accept
responsibility for this fact . . . . It has been our unwillingness to do so that
is most directly responsible for the conflicts between museums, archaeologists, and source countries.”).
193
See id. at 206-14 (detailing True’s “easy betrayal of museum
colleagues”).
194
See id. at 227 (commenting that the Italians wanted “to make an object
lesson out of the Italian’s three biggest targets: Hecht, Medici, and True.”).
195
See id. at 225-27 (noting that the deposition of Tchakos gave the prosecutors enough evidence to indict True on conspiracy charges).
196
See id. at 252 (stating that Medici “invoked his right to a ‘fast track’
trial”).
197
See felCh & frammolino, supra note 1, at 252-53 (noting the trial took
approximately one year due to the slow Italian system).
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The case established the chain of export through Medici, dealing
through Hecht and others, and purchasing through True. Id. at 253.
199
See id. at 258-259 (stating that Marion True is the first American curator
to face criminal charges from a foreign government).
200
This preceded publication of a piece about her obtaining loans from
dealers and donors to enable her to buy a house in Greece. See id. at 266
(commenting that True chose to “voluntarily retire” for violating the
Getty’s policy).
201
See id. at 304 (noting that even though the Getty would receive no
compensation for the objects returned, the Italian Cultural Ministry offered
to loan the Getty comparable objects).
202
See felCh & frammolino, supra note 1, at 296 (explaining that True
portrayed herself as “champion of returning objects to Italy”).
203
See id. at 305-06 (noting that the Cultural Ministry dropped all but three
of its civil claims).
204
Id. at 306.
205
See id. at 312 (remarking that despite a finding of her guilt or innocence, the destruction of her career had been her punishment).
206
Id. at 306 (noting that True continued to deny any wrongdoing).
207
The statue is arguably of Persephone, goddess of fertility, rather than
Aphrodite, goddess of love. felCh & frammolino, supra note 1, at 307
(noting that the Getty had since added a plaque that read: “On loan from
Italy.”).
208
Id. at 307-08.
209
See id. at 311 (“Looting continues around the globe, and wealthy
collectors in Asia, Russia, and the Middle East have quickly filled the void
left by American museums in the antiquities market.”).
210
Contra id. at 311 (noting that after the Getty scandal, other southern
California museums were implicated in a tax fraud scheme accepting donations of looted Southeast Asian artifacts similar to the Frel’s scheme).
211
See generally Clement W. Meighan, Another View on Repatriation:
Lost to the Public, Lost to History, 14 the PUBliC historian 39, 45 (1992)
(defending the role of museums in acquiring looted artifacts for their protection).
212
See felCh & frammolino, supra note 1, at 311 (“American museums have
all but stopped purchasing recently looted Greek and Roman antiquities.”);
contra id. (“Even in America, some museums appear not to have gotten the
message. Even as the Getty scandal made international headlines, several
other southern California museums were caught in a tax fraud scheme to
accept donations of looted Southeast Asian artifacts.”).
213
See generally felCh & frammolino, supra note 1, at 176 (noting that
by far most objects ended up in American museums; there were objects in
New York City, Boston, Cleveland, Tampa, Minneapolis, Princeton, San
Antonio, Fort Worth, and, of course, Los Angeles).
214
Id. at 17.
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